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SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SocIETY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS. By John N. Hazard. New York: Columbia University Press,
1960. Pp. xiv, 534. $9.50.
IN recent years American scholarship on Soviet law has produced a large
number of books devoted primarily to the broad outlines of the Soviet legal
system, its principal stages of development, its relationship to Soviet political,
economic, and social institutions generally, its elements of stability and in-
stability, its continuity or discontinuity with prerevolutionary Russian law,
its reflection of Marxist theory, and similar basic questions of a broad philoso-
phical, historical, and sociological character. These books have contained chap-
ters on various branches of Soviet law, but no detailed, exhaustive study of
any particular aspect. It is a welcome change, therefore, to have from Professor
Hazard's pen a monograph which concentrates on a single part of Soviet law
-namely, the development of the judicial system and the legal profession in
the first eight years of the Bolshevik regime, from 1917 to 1925.
Although the author treats his subject more or less in chronological sequence,
recounting each step as it occurred, he provides a framework of analysis in
the thesis that the professional jurists fought the effort of the political leaders
to simplify the law, to make it flexible and "popular," and that the professionals
were ultimately successful. "It is the purpose of this volume," Professor
Hazard writes in the Preface, "to test with Soviet data the thesis that man can
settle his disputes with simplicity, without elaborately organized tribunals,
without legal representation, without complicated laws, and without a labyrinth
of legal rules of procedure and evidence."' The test shows that the effort to
achieve this goal in the first phase of the Revolution failed, and that in the
early 1920's there developed an elaborate system of courts, prosecutors, and
lawyers, bound by complex, rational codes of criminal and civil procedure.
The first period, from 1917 to 1921, was marked by chaos. The prerevolu-
tionary law was repealed, and no ready-made Marxist legal system was avail-
able to replace it. A quick succession of impromptu decrees on the judiciary
and on the legal profession reflected glaring inconsistencies of purpose and of
method. Soviet law seemed to be riding off in all directions at once. Virtually
the only enduring legal institutions of this period were the system of special
tribunals for political cases, which applied revolutionary justice with a mini-
mum of form and a maximum of proletarian expediency, and, in certain of the
regular courts, the system of lay "people's assessors" who sat as co-judges
together with a single professional judge.
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Otherwise, everything was in flux as one decree superseded another, some-
times within months or even weeks. The system of legal representation, for
example, went through a half-dozen drastic changes, ranging from the pro-
vision that anyone could act as an accuser or defender to a provision that legal
representation was a form of labor duty for which all persons with legal educa-
tion must register. The philosophy which dominated the continual reorganiza-
tion of the judiciary and the bar, Professor Hazard shows, was that these in-
stitutions should be "close to the people," "proletarian," and free from the
"bourgeois legality" of the past.
The theme that even prior to 1921, and especially thereafter, Soviet law
progressed "from simplicity to complexity and formality" is amply demon-
strated by the author. The original dream of a single type of "popular" tribunal
which would administer justice on the basis solely of "revolutionary conscious-
ness" could not be fulfilled. The judges themselves complained that they could
not properly decide cases without the help of lawyers representing the parties.
The regime realized that some cases were too important to be left to local
judges. Once the need for trained lawyers and for central courts was recog-
nized, the idea of a primitive, popular, flexible justice had to give way to the
demand for uniformity and predictability of decisions. In 1922 and 1923 a
series of laws established the organization of the judiciary, of the procuracy,
of the legal profession, and of the state notarial office, as well as the system of
criminal and civil procedure. Despite all the changes of the succeeding years,
the legislation of 1922 and 1923 remains one of the principal foundations of
the Soviet legal system today.
Besides the theme of movement from simplicity to complexity, from flexi-
bility to formality, from expediency to rationality, many subthemes emerge
from the rich materials presented by the author. Regrettably, he does not iden-
tify these subthemes, and the reader must formulate them for himself out of
the abundance of statutes, code provisions, orders of the People's Commissariat
of Justice, judicial decisions, and juristic speeches and writings which are
quoted and analyzed.
One such subtheme is the immense practical importance, from the beginning
of the Revolution, of adjudication as a principle of order. The Soviet leader-
ship, with extraordinary naivet6, supposed that law was a "bourgeois" phe-
nomenon. Their Marxist theory gave them little guidance as to the nature and
functions of a legal system in a proletarian state. As one Soviet jurist wrote
in 1922, "Law is that sphere of social relationships to which Marxist thought
has turned its attention less than to all other aspects of social relationships." 2
Thinking that they could dispense with the entire apparatus of law except for
courts staffed chiefly by laymen, a Commissariat of Justice, and decrees issued
by the top leadership, the new regime discovered that the demands upon these
legal institutions were enormous. People flocked to the courts, or were herded
to them, in droves. We read that in the first six months of 1918 over 13,000
civil cases and probably twice as many criminal cases were tried in those local
2. Quoted p. 164.
[Vol 70:685
REVIEWS
courts in Moscow which reported statistics.3 In 1920, a year when the Civil
War was at its climax, there were 1,187,169 criminal cases in the people's
courts of the country as a whole, not to mention over 190,000 in the military
and civilian revolutionary tribunals plus an unstated number in the tribunals
of the Cheka.4 By the autumn of 1918 there were 3,267 local courts-142 in
the Moscow province alone, 138 in Petrograd. 5 The 65 cases discussed by Pro-
fessor Hazard at various parts of the book give an idea of the variety of prob-
lems which pressed for solution in the judicial process. They seem to show
that paucity of legislation does not necessarily reduce the significance of law;
it may only enhance the role of adjudication.
Another subtheme is the influence of Soviet foreign relations upon the de-
velopment of Soviet law. Here the author's materials cast only a sidelight. It
appears 0 that the first systematic collection of laws issued by the Soviet gov-
ernment was published as a response to requests from foreign Communists
meeting in Moscow in 1920 at the Second Congress of the Communist Inter-
national. The foreign comrades had complained that they were unable to deter-
mine, from the unclassified mass of detailed regulations and decrees promul-
gated by the new regime, what direction Soviet legislation was taking. The
collection was published simultaneously in German, French, and English, as
well as Russian. One wonders to what extent Soviet law in the first years was
addressed, as was the first announcement of the seizure of power by the Bol-
sheviks, "to all"--to what extent the Soviet lawmakers were acting not merely
in response to the pressures from within, which Professor Hazard describes,
but also in response to what they then visualized as an imminent World
Revolution. What the Commissar of Justice saw as a time for simplification
of procedure and flexibility of decision was seen by Lenin and Trotsky as a
time for ushering in the new social order of international communism.
Certainly after 1921, when the Soviet government was seeking some degree
of rapprochement with the West, foreign relations had a direct impact upon
domestic legal developments. In reporting the Fourth Congress of Persons
Engaged in the Administration of Justice, held in Moscow in 1922, Professor
Hazard quotes Commissar of Justice Kurskii to the effect that the law reforms
of that period were brought about in part by the new commercial treaties with
Western countries, which required specific guarantees of persons and property.
Kurskii remarked that when the question of the agenda for the Genoa Con-
ference was being discussed, Lloyd George had said that Soviet Russia would
have to establish a known system of legal norms which would permit other
countries to have permanent relations with her.7 The question of the relation-
ship between internal stability and stability of foreign relations should be con-
nected with another question with which Professor Hazard's book (except for
3. Pp. 13, 14.
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one brief reference 8) does not deal-namely, the extent to which Soviet jurists,
in framing their codes, borrowed from Western legal systems.
In describing the movement from simplicity to complexity, the author does
not neglect the one question which more than any other has concerned Western
observers of Soviet legal developments-the question of the relationship be-
tween the system of judicial administration in ordinary cases and the repres-
sion of political enemies. Since the story is told chronologically, however, the
reader must piece out the answer to this question from different parts of the
book. It appears that so-called "revolutionary tribunals" were established im-
mediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power on November 7, 1917, and that
they became the local courts for all matters.9 It is not clear what the boundaries
of their jurisdiction were after the establishment of regular "people's courts"
on November 24, 1917. In February, 1919, a decree established so-called
"military revolutionary tribunals," to try political and military crimes within
the army.10 At the same time the Cheka-predecessor of the GPU and the
NKVD-had its own tribunals to try political offenses. The term "political"
had the broadest connotation. The Decree on Revolutionary Tribunals of
March 18, 1920, authorized a special board of the Cheka to intern for periods
up to five years people who had committed no crime but were considered
"parasitic elements."" Cheka tribunals also tried cases of speculation and
crimes by officials.'2 With the abolition of the Cheka in February, 1922, its in-
vestigative functions were transferred to the newly created GPU of the People's
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), while its trial jurisdiction was
transferred to the revolutionary tribunals and the regular courts.13 Finally the
Judiciary Act of 1922 and the (second) Code of Criminal Procedure of 1923
eliminated the revolutionary tribunals, transferring their jurisdiction to inter-
mediate (provincial) courts, which were "subject generally to rules applicable
to the people's courts, although they still enjoyed exceptions," including the
right to exclude counsel from the trial. 14 In his concluding chapter the author
sketches very briefly the restoration of special political tribunals of the NKVD
in 1934 and their abolition in 1953.
These shifts are treated, in the concluding pages, as part of a struggle be-
tween "the supreme politicians," who have been mistrustful of law and have
sought to rule without restraint, and "the men who worked in the legal system,
whether in the courts, the procuracy .... the Commissariat of Justice, or the
bar."' 5 The lawyers sought to maintain legality and to humanize their system.











Thus the major theme of the book, the movement toward complexity and
formality, is linked by the author with the struggle for legality in a larger
sense. No evidence is offered, however, to show that the political leaders and
the lawyers ever differed on this larger question. Presumably most Soviet law-
yers are much happier to follow Khrushchev than they were to follow Stalin
(although it must be recalled that it was Stalin who, in the mid-1930's, for
all his terrorism in the political sphere, promoted "stability of laws" in non-
political matters). Yet it is dubious that there was ever a "lawyers' opposition,"
as some of Professor Hazard's statements in effect suggest. In working for the
elimination of revolutionary tribunals in 1922, the leaders of the Commissariat
of Justice surely did not think of themselves as opposing Lenin, who, after all,
sought the same objective. The struggle to achieve a system of legality which
would impose effective restraints upon the executive must be viewed as a
struggle within the legal profession as well as within the political leadership,
rather than as a struggle between the two.
It is to be hoped that Professor Hazard will treat this book as the first of a
multivolume series on the history of the Soviet system of administration of
justice, and will take us, with the same painstaking research, through the
periods of 1926-1936, 1936-1953, and 1953 to the current reforms.
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THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. By A. D. Neale.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. xvi, 516. $7.50.
THIS book, written by a distinguished British civil servant, undertakes to
survey the entire body of antitrust law in the United States. Part I treats the
legality of price fixing and other agreements among competitors, monopoliza-
tion and monopolistic practices, exclusive dealing and tying contracts, mergers
and acquisitions and price discrimination. In addition, there are chapters on
patents and the antitrust laws, international cartels, resale price maintenance,
the administration of the antitrust laws and a final chapter dealing with rem-
edies. Part II of the book considers antitrust as an American policy and then
briefly discusses the question "Antitrust for Export ?"
This comprehensive survey is accomplished within the short confines of
about 500 pages. Most of the important appellate court opinions are discussed
and analyzed. The result is a complete survey as well as a penetrating analysis
of the United States antitrust laws. That this broad coverage has been achieved
within the compass of only 500 pages testifies to the care and judgment with
which the author went about his task.
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